Working Paper 492

MGNREGA Quality Monitoring and Multiplier 'Malai' for the Richer States and Regions: Evidence on Elite Capture of Assets in Karnataka and Ways Forward

Sanjiv Kumar, S Madheswaran, B P Vani

ISBN 978-81-946531-8-9 August 2020

Institute for Social and Economic Change (ISEC) is engaged in interdisciplinary research in analytical and applied areas of the social sciences, encompassing diverse aspects of development. ISEC works with central, state and local governments as well as international agencies by undertaking systematic studies of resource potential, identifying factors influencing growth and examining measures for reducing poverty. The thrust areas of research include state and local economic policies, issues relating to sociological and demographic transition, environmental issues and fiscal, administrative and political decentralization and governance. It pursues fruitful contacts with other institutions and scholars devoted to social science research through collaborative research programmes, seminars, etc.

The Working Paper Series provides an opportunity for ISEC faculty, visiting fellows and PhD scholars to discuss their ideas and research work before publication and to get feedback from their peer group. Papers selected for publication in the series present empirical analyses and generally deal with wider issues of public policy at a sectoral, regional or national level. These working papers undergo review but typically do not present final research results, and constitute works in progress.

Working Paper Series Editor: **M Balasubramanian**

MGNREGA QUALITY MONITORING AND MULTIPLIER 'MALAI'[1] FOR THE RICHER STATES AND REGIONS: EVIDENCE ON ELITE CAPTURE OF ASSETS IN KARNATAKA AND WAYS FORWARD

Sanjiv Kumar[2], S Madheswaran[3] and B P Vani[4]

Abstract

Workfare programme reduces poverty in two ways, i.e., providing wage employment during lean season to many, and sustainable assets, which had multiplier and productivity enhancement impact, to the community and the chosen few. Its wage employment component can be good protection against seasonal shock, but sustainable asset with multiplier impact had livelihood enhancement and poverty elimination impact. This study focuses on the asset component of the programme. Along with Social Audit and Ombudsman, Quality Monitors are the third important accountability institution established under the MGNREGA. The authors have not come across any study on MGNREGA Quality Monitoring, hence, this study tries to examine if a credible Quality Monitoring and its enforcement and follow-up mechanism was put in place in Karnataka. The study finds lackadaisical implementation of Quality Monitoring in Karnataka. Availability of adequate information was an issue for Quality Monitoring in Karnataka. In the absence of a Director, there was no one to coordinate and consolidate the information and assist the State Government and SEGC in monitoring and follow-up on the important findings of the Quality Monitors. State Employment Guarantee Council did not fully appreciate the importance of their work and did not try to actively discuss quality issues and aspects related to further improvement of this institution. Evidences show that there was neither credible Quality Monitoring nor credible enforcement and follow-up mechanism for their reports and findings. Quality Monitors have brought to light a large number of very serious irregularities in the asset quality and quantity, but their findings have remained unattended.

The quality of assets, where (which region or states) it was created and who reaped its benefits are very important questions to understand the programme's effectiveness. Hence, this study tried to incidentally explore them. The study also examines, through both secondary, as well as, primary evidences, if the benefits of sustainable assets created and its multiplier impact was accruing to the poorer states; poorer regions within a state, and to the poor HHs. From the secondary evidences, the study finds that richer and developed states, with less number of poor HHs, were creating more assets than the poorer states with more poverty load. The same trend was noticed across districts within Karnataka state. These meant that assets were not being created in the areas where it was required the most. Primary evidences from Karnataka show elite capture of assets created largely due to the individual assets and benefits of water resource-based community assets accruing predominantly to the landholding HHs proportionate to the size of their holdings. The study explores causes and consequences, and examines the possible policy options and ways forward.

Introduction and Background

There were two ways in which a workfare programme (like MGNREGA) might reduce poverty. The first was by providing wage employment to the poor HH, and the second was by creating sustainable assets of value with multiplier effects to the poor families (Ravallion, 1998). In such programmes there was a trade off between employment generation and the value of assets created which poses a difficult design issue as to how much emphasis should be given to employment, vis-à-vis, creating durable assets? Generally, on an average, 60 percent of the fund is to be spent on wage and 40 percent on material as

---

[1] 'Malai' (Hindi) – Cream (English)

[2] Additional Chief Secretary and Chief Electoral officer, Government of Karnataka

[3] Director, Institute for Social and Economic Change, Bangalore

[4] Associate Professor, CESP, Institute for Social and Economic Change, Bangalore

prescribed, but in practice their proportion may vary considerably as some of the concrete works like panchayat office building, school room, etc. may have very little scope (20 percent or even less) of wage component; and afforestation, horticulture and earth levelling and bunding, may have very large (85 to 100 percent) proportion of wage component. Due to this uniqueness, the theoretical beauty of the NREGS encountered the complexity of practical implementation. Besides offering wide scope for embezzlement of funds (Dreze etal, 2008), it raised a challenge to manage trade-off between reliable provisioning of jobs (wage employment) and creation of sustainable assets, (Shamika Ravi, and Engler Monica, 2015). Some states like Kerala have adapted to foregoing durable assets, as their focus is on creation of wage employment. In Kerala almost a negligible amount is spent on material. But most of the states, including Karnataka, have adhered to the prescribed proportions, where wage component should be 60 percent of the expenditure. In this proportion, it may be difficult to make durable and sustainable assets. Moreover no resource is earmarked for the maintenance of such assets and so the assets created under MGNREGA are of poor quality and often deteriorated very fast. Moreover, the unskilled nature of work is easily exchangeable with machine execution if beneficiaries rent out their cards to the contractors. Critiques alleged large scale use of both contractors and machines under this programme.

Against this background a need was felt to create a system and an agency which could ensure the quality and durability of the assets created under the programme through a planned and calibrated Quality Management Mechanism. Main objectives of the Quality Monitors are to ensure that the asset was durable and it achieved the purpose of sustainable livelihood protection and promotion. Quality management had three dimensions - Quality Control, Quality Supervision and Quality Monitoring. It included internal management in terms of HR development and training of workforce, who could execute and supervise and quality grade works under the programme. Along with Social Audit and Ombudsman, Quality Monitors are the third important accountability institutions established under the MGNREGA.

As per plan at the National, State and District-levels, external quality monitors were to be empanelled who were trained to visit the site for inspection and prepare reports based on which, the Director (Quality Monitoring) is supposed to send to appropriate authority a report, with required counter measures to be taken to rectify/correct deficiencies identified as a result of the inspection. Detailed instructions on the Quality Monitoring were included in the Operational Guidelines of the MGNREGA. Instructions required that all the work should be graded into satisfactory (S), Unsatisfactory (U) and Requiring Improvement (RI) and the information was needed to be uploaded on the NREGA website and visible in public domain. The instruction says that expenses on State Quality Monitors, etc., will be borne out of funds provided by the Central Government to meet administrative expenses of MGNREGA. (MORD, 2013, MGNREGA Operational Guidelines, 4th Edition)

In the light of foregoing discussions, this paper tries to study the following research questions:

1. Whether there is a credible Quality Monitoring Mechanism for MGNREGA works in the State of Karnataka?
2. Whether there is a credible enforcement and follow-up mechanism for the reports and findings of the Quality Monitors?

3. Whether benefits of sustainable assets created and its multiplier impact is accruing to the poorer states, poorer regions within a state and poor HHs?

Brief Review of Literature

MGNREGA, being the largest employment guarantee programme, has attracted a wide range of academic interest, and studying any aspect of it is like the probe of the proverbial elephant by the six blind men. Following are the range of academic papers on MGNREGA asset created, quality monitoring and related issues.

Rao, Kumar and Madhusudan (2013) researched works on individual lands and found that about 79 percent of the sample beneficiaries belonged to the other category while 16 and 5 percent were SC and ST respectively. They concluded that this was due to liberalised guidelines permitting small and marginal farmers within the eligibility criteria which had adverse impact on socially and economically disadvantaged groups.

Bhaskar and Yadav (2015) studied assets created under MGNREGA, particularly wells and its usage in Jharkhand. They found that nearly 96 percent of all the completed NREGA wells were being utilised and 95 percent were being utilised for irrigation. Their study found 190 percent increase in annual net income from agriculture in the command area of the well. The annual average rate of return (ROR) on expenditure was estimated to be 6.5 percent. Nearly 96 percent owners were happy and 92 percent were satisfied with the quality and 85 percent felt that their incomes had gone up as a result of the well.

Chikkathimme Gowda, H. R., (2015) studied the economic impact of MGNREGP on rural livelihood security in Tumkur district, Karnataka, using Social Accounting Matrix for 2012-13. He finds multiplier effects in milk production and dairy cooperatives and tamarind harvesting and processing. Srikanth Murthy, Bhattarai and Kumar (2014-15) studied multiplier impacts of MGNREGA by Social Accounting Matrix in two villages of Karnataka. They found that output multiplier for MGNREGA was a very modest 1.08, which indicated that MGNREGA was yet to make an economic impact in the two villages studied. Koyu, Sarkar, Singh and Singh (2017) gathered field evidence on MGNREGA in Arunachal Pradesh and found that work completion rate was very low (8.05 percent).

Kajale and Shroff (2018) compared the creation of durable assets to ensure some capital formation that increases output and income in rural communities in EAS (Maharashtra State Scheme) and MGNREG. Their paper compared asset creation under the two schemes to conclude that both the schemes had not been successful in creating durable assets that mitigate drought and builds agricultural infrastructure. Kareemulla, Kumar, Reddy, Rao and Venkateshwarlu (2010) examined the impact of NREGS on rural livelihoods and agricultural capital formation and tried to understand the desirability, quality and durability of assets created and found that the quality and maintenance of assets needed more attention in addition to achieving the primary target of creating employment opportunities.

Raghunathan and Hari (2014) researched, using regression-discontinuity and decomposition measure that divide total changes in land allocation into those that increases risk and those that reduces it, and found that the amount of risk in the district-level crop portfolios had increased as a

result of the introduction of the programme. So clearly, the scheme had played a role in crop-choice across the country and risk-proofed the sector.

Babu, Rao and Jayashree (2015) studied the impact of MGNREGS on economies of small agriculture land holders and they examined the profitability and crop yield in the state of Karnataka and found that the individual works taken up under MGNREGS on the lands of small land holders had benefitted those farmers in terms of increase in cropped area and shift towards high-income generating crops in the irrigated areas through productivity enhancement. Narayanamoorthy, Bhattarai and Suresh (2018) studied profitability of food grain production and its alleged decline after implementation of MGNREGA in different parts of India to see if the claimed labour shortage has increased cost of cultivation and caused decline in profitability of five food grain crops. They found that it was not completely true that the profitability had declined but MGNREGA had certainly raised the cost of human labour considerably in all five crops but had made no deleterious effect on profits.

Vani, Murthy and Bhattarai (2018) conducted village study in one of the dry district of Karnataka to understand the multiplier effect of MGNREGA in a village economy using Social Accounting Matrix that helped to establish inter-sectoral linkages. They found that output multiplier (1.14) was highest followed by income (0.39) and employment multiplier (0.30). But the highest impact was on income (2.25) followed by output (1.40) and employment (0.48). Their paper concluded that there was a need to raise awareness, wages and scale of operation of the programme.

Shah, Verma, Indu and Hemant (2010) studied asset creation through Employment Guarantee and synthesised case studies by 40 students that provided insight from nine states of India. This study assessed the scheme against two criteria: satisfaction levels of work seekers with the wage-benefit provided by the scheme, and with the village community with the non-wage benefit created by it through durable social assets. They found that village communities were happier with the non-wage benefits than work seekers were with wage-benefits. This indicated clearly that benefits of asset created was accruing to the village communities at large.

From the literature review it is amply clear that although many interesting academic works are available on the MGNREGA asset created and its quality, but the authors have not come across any work on Quality Monitoring mechanism in the programme and related subjects, hence, the research questions are valid and needs to be further investigated.

Methodology, Database and Tools for the Study

This study uses both quantitative, as well as, qualitative data at micro and macro level. At macro level, secondary data (For selected 13 States and 30 districts in Karnataka) for the study is collected based on availability from the MGNREGA Portal of MORD, MGNREGs Directorate (Karnataka), District Programme Officers etc. To eliminate the effect of annual seasonal variations, average of four years' performance is taken for comparisons, i.e., 2015-16 to 2018-19. The micro level data (From four sample districts in Karnataka) is collected through primary survey of households, who are beneficiaries of MGNREGs, and also some of those who are not beneficiaries. Implementing stakeholders and others are also interviewed with structured questionnaire and through focussed group discussions.

Sampling Design

The study followed a multistage sampling procedure. In the first stage, districts were chosen so as to represent the four administrative divisions in Karnataka. The choice of the districts was based on the past performance in MGNREGA work. Second Stage of sampling involved the choice of taluks and two taluks were chosen from each district based on the past performance – One good performing taluk and one not so good performing taluk, thus, totalling eight taluks were chosen. The Third Stage was the choice of Gram Panchayats and two GPs were chosen randomly from each Taluk totalling 16 GPs. The Final Stage involved the selection of households. A stratified random procedure was applied to choose 20 beneficiaries and 10 non-beneficiaries from each GP. In total, 320 beneficiaries and 160 non-beneficiaries constituted our sample. Women and SC/ST were given due representation in these samples. Structured questionnaires were canvassed with the head of those households. Field data were collected in the year 2018.

Table 1: Districts, Taluks and Gram Panchayats Chosen for the Primary Survey (Karnataka)

Sl. No.	Division	District	Taluk	Gram Panchayat	
1	Bengaluru	Ram Nagaram	Kanakapura	Kallahalli	Kalya
			Magadi	Uyamballi	Kalari Kaval
2	Mysuru	Mysuru	HD Kote	Padukote Kaval	Hampapura
			Nanjanagud	Kempasidhanahalli	Sindhuvalli
3	Kalaburagi	Raichur	Devadurga	HosuraSiddapura	Mundargi
			Manvi	Vatagal	Gorkal
4	Belagavi	Belagavi	Khanapura	Manturga	Itagi
			Chikodi	Ingali	Shamanevadi

Source: Purposive selection by the Author as per the need of the study.

Analysis of Data

Secondary Data Analysis: Asset Creation and Its Multiplier Effects under MGNREGA

Studies indicate a positive return on investment for MGNREGA assets, when planned and executed well. Some studies highlight design – specific and technical quality issue which undermine the potential of those works. The quality and durability of the asset vary vastly across states and districts and cannot be generalised. (MORD, MGNREGA Sameeksha, 2012). It is projected and argued that workfare programmes' wage employment component can be good livelihood protection against seasonal shocks, but durable and sustainable assets created can have multiplier effects of livelihood enhancement, sustenance and poverty elimination. In this part, secondary data is analysed to study the nature of assets created across states and across districts within the state. For comparative clarity only, 13 States are selected for examination, and classified into three categories based on their respective poverty ratios.

Figure 1: MGNREGA - Number of Assets Created (Completed works) per one Lakh Poor HHs in Selected States (Numbers)



Source: Author's construction from the information sourced from the MGNREGA Web Portal of MORD.

Figure 1 shows the number of assets created (completed works) per one lakh poor HHs in selected states (numbers) for four years. States are selected based on their poverty ratios. First four are low poverty ratio states, next four are medium poverty ratio states and remaining five are high poverty ratio states. Karnataka was one of the medium poverty ratio states. From the data it is amply clear that richer and developed states like Telangana, Kerala, Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu, with less number of poor HHs, were creating more assets than the poorer states like Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Jharkhand and Chattisgarh. In essence, the benefit of multiplier effect were being reaped more by the richer states by creating more assets in the Low poverty ratio States under the programme.

Table 2: MGNREGA - Expenditure on Assets Created Per One Lakh Poor HHs in Selected States (Rs. in Lakh)

Sl. No.	State	2015-16	2016-17	2017-18	2018-19
Low Poverty ratio States (Poverty ration >20 percent)					
1	Kerala	41350.42	68762.57	53264.09	37828.53
2	Andhra Pradesh	23828.47	22595.20	25978.94	28440.43
3	Telangana	29267.16	22184.40	20147.55	10478.67
4	Tamil Nadu	36779.04	34135.27	37702.87	20007.89
Medium Poverty ratio states (Poverty ratio 20 to 30 percent)					
5	Gujarat	2506.88	4322.92	4909.06	4177.05
6	Maharashtra	4649.88	4673.46	4160.88	2894.38
7	West Bengal	14195.97	20680.29	17771.21	5497.98
8	Karnataka	8169.79	14265.81	10627.10	6567.77
High Poverty Ratio states (Poverty ratio above 30 percent)					
9	Uttar Pradesh	2098.19	4606.36	4247.18	3550.05
10	Bihar	2172.74	2505.12	2515.10	1102.77
11	Madhya Pradesh	4876.87	6561.41	6372.07	6046.08
12	Jharkhand	6083.25	7948.44	5599.63	3719.46
13	Chhattisgarh	5421.74	11250.48	11713.85	6822.75

Source: Author's construction from the information sourced from the MGNREGA Web Portal of MORD.

Table 2 tabulated expenditure on asset created per one lakh poor HHs in the 13 selected states. This table again shows similar trend with richer states like Kerala, Telangana and Tamil Nadu with lesser number of poor HHs were incurring more expenditure on asset creation per one lakh poor HHs than the poorer States like Uttar pradesh, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Jharkhand, Chattisgarh with more number of poor HHs.

Table 3: MGNREGA - Average cost of Asset Creation in Selected States (Rs. in Lakh)

Sl. No.	State	2015-16	2016-17	2017-18	2018-19
Low Poverty ratio States					
1	Kerala	0.71	0.88	1.15	0.96
2	Andhra Pradesh	0.92	0.28	0.54	0.28
3	Telangana	0.68	0.10	0.29	0.15
4	Tamil Nadu	1.54	1.95	1.44	0.63
Medium Poverty ratio states					
5	Gujarat	0.82	0.62	0.59	0.41
6	Maharashtra	1.40	0.96	0.61	0.33
7	West Bengal	1.38	1.26	0.72	0.15
8	Karnataka	0.53	0.77	0.58	0.38
High Poverty Ratio states					
9	Uttar Pradesh	0.52	0.72	0.70	0.30
10	Bihar	1.27	2.15	1.61	0.43
11	Madhya Pradesh	0.98	0.99	0.65	0.24
12	Jharkhand	1.85	0.82	0.43	0.20
13	Chhattisgarh	1.67	1.21	0.66	0.34

Source: Author's construction from the information sourced from the MGNREGA Web Portal of MORD.

Table 3 tabulated the average cost of asset created in selected 13 States (in Rs lakhs). Costs vary across states and across the year of reference and there is no clear pattern.

Figure 3: MGNREGA - Number of Assets created (Completed works) per one Lakh Poor HHs in Karnataka (Numbers)



Source: Constructed by the Author based on the information sourced from the MGNREGA Web Portal: MORD.

Figure 3 plotted number of assets created (completed works) per one lakh poor HHs in various districts in Karnataka which shows clearly that relatively richer and more developed districts with less number of poor HHs like Ramanagara, Tumkur, Mandya, Kolar, Shimogga and Hassan have more number of assets created per one lakh HHs, whereas it was much lesser for poorer districts with more number of poor and needy HHs. Bidar, Bagalkot, Ballari, Chitradurga, Haveri and Kalaburagi were having much lesser number of assets created per one lakh poor HHs. Average cost of asset created across districts in Karnataka for four sample years show no clear pattern.

Table 4: MGNREGA - Expenditure on Assets created per one Lakh Poor HHs in Karnataka (Rs. In Lakh)

Sl. No.	State	2015-16	2016-17	2017-18	2018-19
1	BAGALKOTE	5958.95	8811.51	6038.90	3714.03
2	BALLARI	4073.88	11692.81	9900.39	9044.18
3	BELAGAVI	6816.64	10983.90	8020.51	4873.26
4	BENGALURU	316.87	1394.31	1164.76	410.56
5	BENGALURU RURAL	5988.94	15576.65	17320.86	11881.23
6	BIDAR	5814.85	6587.38	4488.10	3341.71
7	CHAMARAJA NAGARA	17215.96	25835.93	22659.82	14751.42
8	CHIKKABALLAPURA	13011.15	29241.07	22112.81	15550.59
9	CHIKKAMAGALURU	8477.30	20627.17	16457.40	9779.07
10	CHITRADURGA	12647.27	17218.89	17838.62	9020.45
11	DAKSHINA KANNADA	7065.88	17096.46	14345.87	8029.09
12	DAVANAGERE	8980.00	14675.28	10160.65	5143.66
13	DHARWAR	6969.49	12113.45	5774.84	2993.02
14	GADAG	7168.14	19623.01	12615.03	6589.05
15	HASSAN	13914.18	28029.03	21290.15	14361.47
16	HAVERI	6012.64	11135.09	6679.40	2571.35
17	KALABURAGI	5063.35	7046.91	3876.32	1383.73
18	KODAGU	2262.32	5230.01	5355.19	4446.17
19	KOLAR	38403.95	36417.54	22132.06	21506.02
20	KOPPAL	6959.23	12310.11	9089.13	4451.20
21	MANDYA	7847.03	21150.48	18770.38	10486.07
22	MYSURU	7182.70	19240.93	13647.19	8438.51
23	RAICHUR	12114.68	18673.01	13804.36	11502.51
24	RAMANAGARA	49598.03	97726.80	85042.36	37644.00
25	SHIVAMOGGA	12059.18	20868.22	15297.44	7611.11
26	TUMAKURU	10206.46	27585.13	21862.26	17886.87
27	UDUPI	2084.11	5674.74	5899.59	2466.07
28	UTTARA KANNADA	11643.21	18631.10	9625.62	5250.09
29	VIJAYPURA	5851.62	9665.23	5882.67	4637.00
30	YADGIR	8268.09	9877.39	6923.33	4956.92

Source: Constructed by the Author based on the information sourced from the MGNREGA Web Portal: MORD.

****

Table 4 tabulated expenditure on assets created per one lakh poor HHs across districts in Karnataka. Some of the districts with less number of poor households and consequent less requirement of asset creation for multiplier effect like Ramanagara, Kolar, Hassan, Tumkur, Chikkaballapur showed more expenditure on assets created per one lakh poor HHs when compared to the poorer districts with higher number of poor HHs like Kalaburagi, Haveri, Koppal, Bidar and Bagalkot etc.

Table 5: MGNREGA – Percentage of Expenditure on Various Categories of works from 2015-16 to 2018-19 (Average)

Sl. No.	States	Percentage of Expenditure		
		Public Works	Individual Assets	Rural Infrastructure
Low Poverty Ratio States				
1	Kerala	65	24	11
2	Andhra Pradesh	32	28	40
3	Telangana	45	23	32
4	Tamil Nadu	70	5	25
Medium Poverty Ratio States				
5	Gujarat	40	21	39
6	Maharashtra	37	37	26
7	West Bengal	40	22	38
8	Karnataka	32	28	40
High Poverty Ratio States				
9	Uttara Pradesh	41	16	43
10	Bihar	41	9	50
11	Madhya Pradesh	24	39	37
12	Jharkhand	29	55	16
13	Chhattisgarh	38	28	34

Source: Author's construction from the information sourced from the MGNREGA Web Portal of MORD

Table 5 tabulated average relative percentage of expenditure in different selected states on public works, Individual assets and Rural Infrastructure for last four years to understand their relative preferences for work. There are considerable variations across states in terms of individual works and public works and rural infrastructure. State like Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and Tamil Nadu have sparingly invested on individual assets whereas in Telangana, Kerala, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra and Karnataka Individual assets have considerable investment and preference. Rural infrastructure consists of rural roads etc and this category of works benefits everyone. Public Works are mostly soil and water conservation works and these predominantly benefit the better of HHs who have land. Landless HHs do not derive any benefits from such work. Landless HHs also have least individual work taken up for them as they do not have land and they can only be selected for housing and toilet construction.

Table 6: MGNREGA - Material and Wage component (%) in selected States

Sl. No.	State	2015-16		2016-17		2017-18		2018-19	
		Wage %	Material %	Wage %	Material %	Wage %	Material %	Wage %	Material %
Low Poverty Ratio States									
1	Kerala	97.71	2.29	92.79	7.21	89.75	10.25	91.49	8.51
2	Andhra Pradesh	59.18	40.82	62.11	37.89	57.61	42.39	61.69	38.31
3	Telangana	85.9	14.1	76.84	23.16	66.66	33.34	60.2	39.8
4	Tamil Nadu	79.95	20.05	81.43	18.57	86.87	13.13	77.97	22.03
Medium Poverty Ratio States									
5	Gujarat	76.69	23.31	67.32	32.68	74.35	25.65	67.33	32.67
6	Maharashtra	74.63	25.37	67.83	32.17	72.06	27.94	71.83	28.17
7	West Bengal	77.91	22.09	80.21	19.79	76.38	23.62	76.95	23.05
8	Karnataka	64.78	35.22	67.06	32.94	68.77	31.23	66.37	33.63
High Poverty Ratio States									
9	Uttar Pradesh	81.4	18.6	81.43	18.57	74.24	25.76	68.16	31.84
10	Bihar	67.29	32.71	69.61	30.39	62.84	37.16	69.97	30.03
11	Madhya Pradesh	64.48	35.52	65.79	34.21	67.46	32.54	66.3	33.7
12	Jharkhand	69.39	30.61	67.40	32.6	68.49	31.51	62.36	37.64
13	Chhattisgarh	71.34	28.66	75.88	24.12	60.64	39.36	77.76	22.24

Source: Author's construction from the information sourced from the MGNREGA Web Portal of MORD.

***

Table 6 gives the comparative details of material component across states showing considerable variations. Interestingly, low poverty ratio states, except Andhra Pradesh, are showing unusually low ratio (2.29 percent to 33 percent) of material component for all the four years examined. Karnataka showed 31.23 to 35.22 percent variation in material component. Excepting Andhra Pradesh, which has breached the condition of less than 40 percent to be spent on material component in the year 2015-16 and 2017-18, all other States have adhered to the norm.

Table 7: MGNREGA - District wise Material and Wage Component (%) in Karnataka

Sl. No.	District Name	2015-16		2016-17		2017-18		2018-19	
		Wage %	Material %	Wage %	Material %	Wage %	Material %	Wage %	Material %
1	Bagalkote	61.03	38.97	64.93	35.07	63.5	36.5	70.41	29.59
2	Bellari	64.41	35.59	74.21	25.79	74.97	25.03	70.31	29.69
3	Belagavi	70.24	29.76	65.18	34.82	68.88	31.12	60.2	39.8
4	Bengaluru	60.23	39.77	82.66	17.34	92.48	7.52	87.59	12.41
5	Bengaluru Rural	65.82	34.18	63.8	36.2	63.68	36.32	64.31	35.69
6	Bidar	59.91	40.09	65.93	34.07	70.88	29.12	72.1	27.9
7	Chamarajanagara	56.93	43.07	63.2	36.8	71.63	28.37	66.36	33.64
8	Chikkaballapura	62.89	37.11	63.23	36.77	68.02	31.98	65.13	34.87
9	Chikkamagaluru	67.2	32.8	63.64	36.36	69.84	30.16	72.67	27.33
10	Chitradurga	63.04	36.96	63.08	36.92	62.52	37.48	58.26	41.74
11	Dakshina Kannada	68.88	31.12	66.22	33.78	68.21	31.79	62.9	37.1
12	Davangere	47.88	52.12	63.25	36.75	64.82	35.18	64.55	35.45
13	Dharwad	63.42	36.58	65.12	34.88	65.58	34.42	65.51	34.49
14	Gadag	62.16	37.84	72.54	27.46	71.33	28.67	66.35	33.65
15	Hassan	59.2	40.8	62.89	37.11	64.96	35.04	62.9	37.1
16	Haveri	65.62	34.38	66.35	33.65	69.01	30.99	66.01	33.99
17	Kalaburgi	64.02	35.98	82.45	17.55	71.86	28.14	84.41	15.59
18	Kodagu	71.38	28.62	72.7	27.3	74.42	25.58	67.25	32.75
19	Kolar	60.55	39.45	63.46	36.54	70.24	29.76	67.47	32.53
20	Koppal	63.84	36.16	69.59	30.41	66.31	33.69	66.63	33.37
21	Mandya	71.16	28.84	72.13	27.87	77.55	22.45	74.08	25.92
22	Mysore	64.72	35.28	61.57	38.43	70.79	29.21	64.23	35.77
23	Raichur	74.32	25.68	76.86	23.14	76.79	23.21	76.15	23.85
24	Ramanagara	71.76	28.24	62.84	37.16	61.2	38.8	62.76	37.24
25	Shivmogga	78.31	21.69	71.53	28.47	75.14	24.86	69.14	30.86
26	Tumakuru	62.3	37.7	63.4	36.6	64.76	35.24	57.39	42.61
27	Udupi	92.6	7.4	88.73	11.27	84.27	15.73	74.01	25.99
28	Uttara Kannada	75.1	24.9	77.01	22.99	80.19	19.81	76.58	23.42
29	Vijayapura	61.8	38.2	64.45	35.55	69.06	30.94	59.83	40.17
30	Yadgir	56.72	43.28	67.49	32.51	76.68	23.32	76.09	23.91
	Total	**64.78**	**35.22**	**67.06**	**32.94**	**68.77**	**31.23**	**66.37**	**33.63**

Source: Author's construction from the information sourced from the MGNREGA Web Portal of MORD.

Table 7 gives the comparative details of wage and material components across districts in Karnataka. As per norm, at least 60 percent of the funds under the MGNREGA should be spent on wage component. Except for Bidar, Chamarajnagar and Yadgir in 2015-16 and Chitradurga, Tumkur and Vijayapura in 2018-19, where more than 40 percent of expenditure is on material components, districts in Karnataka have adhered to the norm.

MGNREGA Quality Monitoring in Karnataka

In Karnataka, for the first time in 2013-14 about nine State and 16 District Quality Monitors were empanelled. State Quality Monitors (SQM) were retired Chief Engineers or Superintending Engineers

and District Quality Monitors (DQM) were retired Executive Engineers. They were required to visit allotted districts for eight to 10 days in a month to inspect the MGNREGA works and assess their quality through quantitative and qualitative standards laid down and submit reports in prescribed format. Their salary and remuneration and other perks were benchmarked with the Quality Monitors already appointed under other programme by RDPR. It was prescribed that every six month their work will be evaluated. They were to work up to the age of 70 years. They were entitled to get Rs. 2,500 per day daily allowance, Rs. 250 incidental charges, and Rs. 250 for preparing report and Travelling allowance as per actuals.

Case Study 1: Review of Quality Controller's findings by the State Employment Guarantee Council (SEGC): Analysis of the Meeting Notes Made Available

Sl. No.	Item	Meeting Dates		
1	Date of SEGC Meeting	**26.06.2012**	**30.12.2014**	**23.07.2016**
2	Meeting notes Paragraphs dealing with Quality Controller's findings	Nil	7.5.4	8
3	Pages	Nil	104	137-141
4	Does it give earlier year's details and compliance in terms of recovery etc.?	Nil	No	At paragraph 7.5.4 of meeting proceeding dated 30.10.2014 noted that 9 State and 16 District Quality Monitors were empanelled. They had visited 570 GPs and inspected 1,296 works and ordered Rs. 60.88 lakh recovery. Quality Monitoring State Director post was created but it was decided to obtain services of one consultant. It was proposed to empanel 70 Quality Monitors and the Committee only recorded all the above and approved initiating appointment.
5	Does it give separately and clearly last one year's work and compliance?	Nil	No	Yes
6	Does earlier Meeting Proceedings annexed with the meeting notes give details of Quality Controller subject being meaningfully Reviewed by the SEGC committee.	Nil	No	No Discussion took place. Mere recording of achievements of Quality Controllers recorded.
7	Is compliance to earlier findings meaningful and effective?	Nil	No	It mentions that Rs.2.62 Crore recoveries are ordered from 7,941 spot inspections in 1,041 GP till May 2016, and only Rs.92,866 were recovered in Ramanagara and from other districts no report is received.
8	Main aspects mentioned in the pages annexed in the meeting notes	Nil	* It merely has details of appointment of 9 State and 16 District Quality Monitors. * It records that in 570 GPs 1,296 works were inspected and Rs.60.88 lakhs of recovery were ordered.	* Cumulative details of State/District Quality Monitors Given showing 1,041 GPs examined against 1,154 entrusted. 7,941 works inspected with identified 382 works having Rs.26.242 Crore objection amount. It gives details of appointment of 7 States and 32 District Quality Monitors.

Source: Authors construction based on RDPR, Karnataka archives (3 Meeting notes made available)

Table 8: Cumulative Progress of State/District Quality Monitors (20.10.14)

Sl. No.	No. of GPs Under Inspection	Taluk/GPs from which Reports are Pending	Name of SQM/DQM	No. of GPs from which Reports are Received	No. of GPs from which Reports are not received
1	37	-	Sri Mahesh Mudhol	37	-
2	31	Tumkur, Chitradurga	Sri K Ravikumar	26	5
3	31	-	Sri Changalarayagowda	31	-
4	15	-	Sri Devaraju	15	-
5	27	Madikeri, Alagavadi, Annehala, Ingalada	Sri B S Kumar	23	4
6	32	-	Sri Narayana Murthy	32	-
7	38	-	Sri Janthali	38	-
8	28	Korotagi, Balaganuru, Babaleshwara	Sri Yalleri	25	3
9	33	-	Sri Ramakrishna	33	-
10	31	Hassan, Harappanahalli, Anaburu, Asagoda, Diddagi	Sri K Manjunath	24	7
11	15	-	Sri Govindappa	9	6
12	37	-	Sri S Nataraja	37	-
13	25	Mandya, Bijapur, Chikkaballapur	Sri Doddachowdappa	19	6
14	20	-	Sri Amarashetti	11	-
15	47	-	Sri Shekarappa	47	-
16	9	Kuratti Hosuru, Kolegala, Challakere, Bangarapete	Sri Ashok Kumar Guptha	5	4
17	52	Jivargee, Hanumanthapura, Heeremallanahole, Kalladevarapura	Sri Mallimath	47	5
18	20	Kyasenahalli, Pallagatte	Sri Sulthan Shariff	18	2
19	40	-	Sri Gurulingaswamy	40	-
20	36	-	Sri Jumbagi	36	-
21	19	Kolagondanahalli, Narayanapura	Sri S Gopal	17	2
22	-	-	Sri Shiri	-	-
	623			**570**	**53**

Source: Author's construction from the State Employment Guarantee Council meeting note dated: 28.10.2014

There was a provision to appoint one or more DQMs for each district as per requirement. Similarly, as per the need, one or more SQMs could be appointed at the State level. MORD wanted a State Director for Quality Monitoring to supervise and coordinate the timely planning; execution and monitoring of Quality Management work in the state and to ensure SQM/DQM were appointed in time and supervised closely. But the State Employment Guarantee Council and RDPR did not appreciate the critical work to be done by the Director and, hence, the Council decided not to appoint any Director and they instructed to get such work done by one of the consultants. As there is no full-time Director to coordinate and guide the Quality Management work, quality monitoring was very poorly organised and managed in the State. Today, it is very difficult to obtain basic information about Quality Management in Karnataka. We requested the department to make available disaggregated district-wise and year-wise work done by DQM/SQM and the details of the compliance to their findings etc. but could not get much information from them. MGNREGA portal or RDPR website also does not provide information on Quality

Management initiatives in Karnataka. In the RDPR annual reports also there was no information available. Hence we had to depend on the limited information available with us in the three meeting notes of the State Employment Guarantee Councils (SEGC) of the year 2012, 2014 and 2016; and a bunch of government orders appointing SQM/DQM and a table purported to be showing cumulative progress under the Quality Management in the State made available by the RDPR Department.

Three meeting notes were examined and relevant facts on Quality Monitor are made into a case study – 1. As is evident, Quality Management subject was not placed before the SEGC meeting dated 26.06.2012 but in subsequent two meetings the subject was placed, but not discussed in detail. In the meeting of 30.12.2014, first time at para 7.5.4 the Quality Management subject was taken up but very limited information was placed before the committee. It mentioned that nine State and 16 District QMs were appointed and in 570 Gram Panchayats 1,296 works were inspected by the QMs and Rs. 60.88 lakhs was ordered for recovery by them. In the SEGC meeting date 23.07.2016, more details were placed before the committee. It showed in compliance to earlier findings that Rs. 2.62 crore were ordered for recovery after 7,941 spot inspections in 1,041 Gram Panchayats. It further mentioned that Rs. 92,866 was recovered in Ramanagara district and from other districts reports were awaited. It gave also consolidated cumulative details of SQM/DQM works in 1041 Gram Panchayats examined by them. They found deficiencies in 382 works worth Rs. 26.242 crore. The case study clearly showed that the SEGC did not fully appreciate the importance and significance of the work of quality monitors and did not actively try to strengthen the institution. They neither encouraged QMs in their endeavour of indentifying irregularities and deficiencies in the quality of works nor did they press for compliance through recovery of amounts or quality correction by the defaulters, etc.

Table 9: Cumulative Progress State / District Quality Monitors (31.05.2016)

Sl. No.	Name of the SQM/DQM	No. Of GPs allotted for Inspection	No. Of GPs Inspected	No. Of GPs Non-Inspected	No. Of Works Inspected	Estimated Amount (Rs. In Lakhs)	Spent Amount (Rs. In Lakhs)	Objected Amount (Rs. In lakhs)
1	M.N.Shekarappa	85	82	0	336	2118	1341.73	7736661
2	Manjunath K Janthali	70	68	0	482	1918.51	954.013	369926
3	Prakash Yaleri	26	20	6	184	565.53	359.76	379755
4	Gurulinga swamy	74	69	2	490	1879	1152.3	5251877
5	S Nataraj	74	73	0	490	1750	1034.74	1694523
6	H.S.RamaKrishna Rao	70	69	0	497	1678.07	1293.844	2325667
7	H Devaraj	45	31	-	140	265.232	217.911	1116000
8	B.S.Kumar	43	30	14	190	599.17	342.38	10100
9	Prabhakar Ganiga	19	17	0	197	359.72	276.882	179869
10	Dr. Venkataswamy	25	23	0	456	1131.88	432.48	158542
11	A. Ashwathiah	23	20	1	307	392.076	401.8	1958453
12	H.R. Prakash	19	13	4	184	565.13	359.8	441214
13	Sri. Shila Jambigi	54	51	0	347	764.66	431.7	1005431
14	S.B.Agnaal	23	18	3	263	645	428	347193
15	A.S.Gangaraj	17	4	13	25	17.88	12.6	475764
16	Mahesh Mudol	87	83	2	604	1753.85	971.2	788940
17	T. Changala Raya Gowda	52	54	0	490	1726.06	1024.28	1381390
18	Gopal S	49	46	3	305	1014.4	645.97	41859
19	K. Manjunath	43	38	2	236	762.62	497.3	554000
20	M.N. Maheshwarappa	6	6	0	19	56.35	36.7	25396
21	Basavaraj Malimat	62	59	3	284	663.08	411.8	-
22	K.R.Shekarappa	15	12	3	75	183.9	130.3	-
23	Veerabadrappa v Shiri	49	45	4	367	1173.9	848.8	-
24	B.H. Yogesh	23	21	0	197	597.402	319.8	-
25	Syed Bare Syed Abdul Rahim	24	21	1	211	374.78	192.4	-
26	Basavaraj Chikka Naragunda	14	10	4	67	368.88	132.6	-
27	Sulthana Sharif	45	43	0	300	950.3	757.166	-
28	G.R.Hiremat	18	15	0	198	1605.23	680.6	-
Total		**1154**	**1041**	**65**	**7941**	**25880.61**	**15688.876**	**262,42,560**

Source: Author's construction from the State Employment Guarantee Council Meeting Notes dated: 23.07.2016

From the Management Information System (MIS), developed to maintain quality control, it was evident that very few types of information were collected and placed before the authorities to monitor the work of QM and the consequent compliance. There were no information on how much of the objection raised by the QMs were complied with by the implementing agencies and in what forms? No information was available on recovery or work improvement by repairing and upgrading the works. It was not evident how many disciplinary or criminal actions were proposed and undertaken. Nothing is verifiable as no relevant information is either collected or taken up for monitoring.

Table 10: Cumulative Progress of State/ District Quality Monitors (31.03.2019)

Sl. No.	Name of the SQM/DQM	No. Of GPs allotted for Inspection	No. Of GPs Inspected	No. Of Works Inspected	Estimated Amount (Rs. In Lakhs)	Spent Amount (Rs. In Lakhs)	Objected Amount (Rs. In lakhs)
1	M.N. Shekarappa	109	109	741	3704.91	2493.53	7817057
2	Manjunath K Janthali	89	89	706	3575.03	1869.33	369926
3	Prakash Yaleri	26	20	184	565.53	359.76	379755
4	Gurulinga swamy	91	91	698	2597.61	1635.71	4973135
5	S. Nataraj	99	99	741	2417.43	1427.66	2481325
6	H.S. RamaKrishna Rao	86	86	697	2718.21	2099.73	12684145
7	H. Devaraj	45	45	140	265.23	217.91	116000
8	B.S. Kumar	43	30	190	599.17	342.38	10100
9	Prabhakar Ganiga	25	25	318	698.52	528.26	255146
10	Dr. Venkataswamy	50	50	1067	3230.37	1622.12	158542
11	A. Ashwathiah	37	37	848	1593.9	1267.75	2349006
12	H.R. Prakash	39	39	486	1657.48	1105.8	941214
13	Sri. Shila Jambigi	71	71	610	1820.61	1290.01	1105331
14	S.B. Agnaal	43	43	703	1823.01	1212.6	347193
15	A.S. Gangaraj	17	8	25	17.88	12.6	155732
16	Mahesh Mudol	105	105	836	3044.86	1503.11	788940
17	T. Changala Raya Gowda	60	60	555	2037.43	1281.05	1381390
18	Gopal S	51	51	366	1148.08	753.26	41859
19	K. Manjunath	43	42	256	861.84	543.02	554000
20	M.N. Maheshwarappa	6	6	19	56.35	36.7	25396
21	Basavaraj Malimat	77	77	466	1571.23	989.14	-
22	K.R. Shekarappa	20	20	124	384.96	260.57	-
23	Veerabadrappa V Shiri	62	62	510	1670.49	1192.18	-
24	B.H. Yogesh	36	36	388	1169.31	756.55	-
25	Syed Bare Syed Abdul Rahim	24	23	249	448.31	218.26	-
26	Basavaraj Chikka Naragunda	14	12	67	368.88	132.6	-
27	Sulthana Sharif	45	28	466	1748.02	1335.01	-
28	G.R. Hiremat	39	39	522	4259.47	2706.28	-
29	K. Ravikumar	11	11	70	376.19	269.01	-
30	I.V. Nagesh	10	10	194	443.3	376.83	-
31	R. Narashimha Murthy	12	12	104	584.09	408.24	-
32	D.B. Nerli	3	3	22	43.28	34.25	-
33	R.N. Lakshman	6	6	85	410.38	178.93	-
34	S.N. Venkatesh	12	12	155	341.27	243.48	74433
35	N. Mahadevan	8	8	58	219.15	163.31	-
36	P. Dowlath Husen	10	10	102	251.54	157.84	-
Total		**1,524**	**1,475**	**13,768.00**	**48,723.32**	**31,024.77**	**370,09,625.00**

Source: Author's construction based on information obtained from the Karnataka RDPR Archives.

Views of Beneficiaries on Quality of Assets and their Utility in Karnataka:

Workers (beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries) through a Structured Questionnaire were asked certain questions regarding types and quality of works executed in their village or on their land and who benefited from the same. Table 11 to Table 17 gives disaggregated analytical details of the same.

Table 11: Percentage of Beneficiaries/Non Beneficiaries Who Mentioned the Following Types of Work Done at Their Village

	Ramanagara	Mysore	Raichur	Belagavi	Total
Badu	0.0	0.0	18.3	8.7	8.4
Check dam	11.9	0.9	15.7	13.0	12.3
Drainage	23.5	33.0	1.7	4.9	11.8
Tank Desilt	0.0	9.6	26.9	16.8	14.6
Krishi Honda	5.8	0.0	6.6	17.7	9.3
House Construction	8.4	5.2	0.0	5.4	4.5
Toilet construction	0.0	4.3	5.7	5.2	3.8
Road	24.8	42.6	14.6	20.7	22.1
Plantation	1.0	2.6	9.4	7.3	5.8
Cattle shed	12.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.4
Land Levelling	10.9	0.0	0.3	0.0	3.1
Other	1.3	1.7	0.9	0.3	0.9
Total	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**

Source: Author's calculations based on Primary Survey Data (Beneficiaries Questionnaire)

Table 11 gives the details of works which were taken up in different districts as told by the workers who responded. Roads were (22.1 percent) the largest work group followed by Tank Desilting (14.6 percent), Check Dam (12.3 percent), Drainage (11.8 percent), Krishi Honda (8.4 percent) respectively. Other works included Plantation, House Construction, Toilet, Cattle Shed and Land levelling. There had been some regional variations across districts with Ramanagara having emphasis on Roads (24.8 percent) and Drainage (23.5 percent); Mysore having Road (42.6 percent) and Drainage (33 percent); Raichur having Tank Desilting (26.9 percent) and Badu Nirman (18.3 percent) and Belagavi having emphasis on Roads (20.7 percent) and Krishi Honda (17.7 percent).

Table 12: Percentage of Respondents Who Felt that MGNREGA Work Helped the Village

	Ramanagara	Mysore	Raichur	Belagavi	Total
Yes	81.6	95.8	88.6	90.2	88.6
No (Individual benefit)	18.4	4.2	11.4	9.8	11.4
Total	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**

Source: Author's calculations based on Primary Survey Data (Beneficiaries Questionnaire)

Table 12 gives details of whether village community at large benefited by the work and 88.6 percent of the respondents said in affirmative, with lowest affirmative response was for Ramanagara (81.6 percent) followed by Raichur (88.6 percent), Belagavi (90.02 percent) and Mysore (95.8 percent) respectively.

Table 13: Percentage of Respondents Who were Satisfied with the Quality of Work

	Ramanagara	Mysore	Raichur	Belagavi	Total
Yes	92.3	86.6	72.4	75.9	81.1
No (Individual benefit)	7.7	13.4	27.6	24.1	18.9
Total	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**

Source: Author's calculations based on Primary Survey Data (Beneficiaries Questionnaire)

Table 13 gives the satisfaction level with the quality of work, and 81.1 percent of the respondents expressed satisfaction. Highest satisfaction level was in Ramanagara (92.3 percent), followed by Mysore (86.6 percent), Belagavi (75.9 percent) and Raichur (72.4 percent) respectively.

Table 14A: Distribution of Usage of Assets by Different Sections of People

Beneficiaries	Ramanagara	Mysore	Raichur	Belagavi	Total
All Farmers/ Villagers/Community	100.0	72.9	90.1	98.8	91.8
Melvarga	0.0	0.0	9.9	0.0	2.6
SC/ST	0.0	27.1	0.0	1.2	5.6
Total	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**
Non Beneficiaries					
All Farmers/ Villagers/Community	100.0	88.7	88.1	100.0	91.6
Melvarga	0.0	1.6	9.5	0.0	3.5
SC/ST	0.0	9.7	2.4	0.0	4.9
Total	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**
Beneficiaries	**SC**	**ST**	**OBC**	**Others**	**Total**
All Farmers/ Villagers/Community	92.6	81.0	95.3	94.0	91.8
Melvarga	4.4	1.7	2.3	2.0	2.6
SC/ST	2.9	17.2	2.3	4.0	5.6
Total	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**
Non Beneficiaries					
All Farmers/ Villagers/Community	87.5	92.3	93.6	92.1	91.6
Melvarga	9.4	0.0	4.3	0.0	3.5
SC/ST	3.1	7.7	2.1	7.9	4.9
Total	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**
Beneficiaries	**Landless**	**Marginal [<1hec]**	**Small [1 to 2 hec]**	**Semi Medium [2 to 4 hec]**	**Total**
All Farmers/ Villagers/Community	80.2	99.1	96.3	93.5	91.7
Melvarga	4.0	0.0	3.7	6.5	2.6
SC/ST	15.8	0.9	0.0	0.0	5.6
Total	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**
Non Beneficiaries					
All Farmers/ Villagers/Community	92.9	90.6	100.0	75.0	91.6
Melvarga	2.9	1.9	0.0	25.0	3.5
SC/ST	4.3	7.5	0.0	0.0	4.9
Total	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**

Table 14B: Distribution of Usage of Assets by Different Sections of People

Beneficiaries	Lower Middle Class	Middle Class	Supper Middle Class	Total
All Farmers/ Villagers/Community	91.7	90.7	94.8	91.8
Melvarga	2.4	3.1	1.7	2.6
SC/ST	6.0	6.2	3.4	5.6
Total	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**
Non Beneficiaries				
All Farmers/ Villagers/Community	96.8	91.0	69.2	91.6
Melvarga	0.0	4.5	15.4	3.5
SC/ST	3.2	4.5	15.4	4.9
Total	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**

Source: Author's calculations based on Primary Survey Data (Beneficiaries Questionnaire)

Tables 14A and 14B gives details of who used the asset created under MGNREGA. Overwhelming 91.8 percent of respondent beneficiaries said that all the farmers, villagers and community at large benefitted by them. About 5.6 percent respondents thought that SC/ST used and 2.6 percent thought Upper Strata of Society (Melvarga) used it most. About 91.6 percent non-beneficiaries thought that all farmers/villagers/community benefitted where as 4.9 percent thought SC/ST and 3.5 percent thought Upper Class benefitted.

Table 15: Percentage of HHs who got the work done in their Land

Districts	Percent
Ramanagara	50.6
Mysore	13.5
Raichur	58
Belagavi	42.9
Total	**43.9**
Social Group	
SC	27.3
ST	40
OBC	49.6
Others	56.3
Total	**43.9**
Landholding	
Landless	4.2
Marginal [<1hec]	63.2
Small [1 to 2 hec]	64.8
Semi Medium [2 to 4 hec]	61.3
Total	**44.2**
Asset Group	
Lower Middle Class	27.2
Middle Class	43.7
Upper Middle Class	68.4
Total	**43.9**

Source: Author's calculations based on Primary Survey Data (Beneficiaries Questionnaire)

Table 16: Percentage of respondents who were satisfied with the individual work

District	Percent
Ramanagara	94.9
Mysore	34.2
Raichur	74.1
Belagavi	96.4
Total	**78.8**
Social Group	
SC	66
ST	69.6
OBC	86.3
Others	84.8
Total	**78.8**
Land holding	
Landless	70.7
Marginal [<1hec]	83.9
Small [1 to 2 hec]	80
Semi Medium [2 to 4 hec]	82.1
Total	**78.8**
Asset Group	
Lower Middle Class	77.3
Middle Class	79.1
Upper Middle Class	80.4
Total	**78.8**

Source: Author's calculations based on Primary Survey Data (Beneficiaries Questionnaire)

Table 15 shows percentage of HH who got the work done in their land. Across districts, variations were noticed with Raichur having (58.0 percent), followed by Ramanagara (50.6 percent), Belagavi (42.9 percent) and Mysore (13.5 percent). Across Social Groups there was a clear trend of elite capture as SC (27.3 percent) had the lowest, followed by ST (40.00 percent), OBC (49.6 percent) and Others (56.3 percent) were having the largest number of beneficiaries of work. Land holding showed more pronounced elite capture with Landless (9.2 percent) having the least, followed by Marginal (63.2 percent), Small (64.8 percent) and Semi Medium (61.3 percent) respectively having more asset created for them. Asset holding categories also show strong bias towards the richer and creamy layer with Lower Middle Class (27.2 percent) having the least, followed by Middle Class (43.7 percent) and Upper Middle Class (68.4 percent) having more assets created for them.

Table 16 gives details of respondents who were satisfied with individual works. Satisfaction level varies across districts, Social Groups, Land and Asset holding groups. Belagavi (96.4 percent) showed more satisfaction, followed by Ramanagara (94.9 percent), Raichur (74.1 percent) and Mysore (34.2 percent) having the least. Among the social groups OBCs (86.3 percent) had highest level of satisfaction, followed by Others (84.8 percent), ST (69.6 percent) and SC (66.0 percent) were the least satisfied. Satisfaction level for landless was the least (70.7 percent) and landed households were more satisfied with 80.0 to 83.9 percent of them responding affirmatively. Asset groups also showed positive correlation with higher the asset holding of the HH and higher being their satisfaction.

Table 17: Type of Work Done in Individual Land

	Ramanagara	**Mysore**	**Raichur**	**Belagavi**	**Total**
Badu Nirmana	2.1	0.0	40.4	44.4	26.1
Plantation	27.1	42.9	4.3	0.0	13.0
Krishi Honda	8.3	14.3	42.6	27.8	25.4
Land Levelling	58.3	0.0	12.8	27.8	31.9
House Construction	0.0	28.6	0.0	0.0	1.4
Toilet	0.0	14.3	0.0	0.0	0.7
Borewell recharge	4.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.4
Total	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**
	SC	**ST**	**OBC**	**Others**	**Total**
Badu Nirmana	50.0	31.8	14.1	37.0	26.1
Plantation	5.6	13.6	16.9	7.4	13.0
Krishi Honda	16.7	31.8	22.5	33.3	25.4
Land Levelling	22.2	22.7	43.7	14.8	31.9
House Construction	0.0	0.0	1.4	3.7	1.4
Toilet	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.7	0.7
Borewell recharge	5.6	0.0	1.4	0.0	1.4
Total	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**

	Landless	Marginal [<1hec]	Small [1 to 2 hec]	Semi Medium [2 to 4 hec]	Total
Badu Nirmana	0.0	33.8	18.4	13.6	26.1
Plantation	0.0	9.5	23.7	9.1	13.0
Krishi Honda	0.0	23.0	18.4	45.5	25.4
Land Levelling	0.0	31.1	36.8	31.8	31.9
House Construction	50.0	0.0	2.6	0.0	1.4
Toilet	50.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.7
Borewell recharge	0.0	2.7	0.0	0.0	1.4
	100.0	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**

	Lower Middle Class	Middle Class	Upper Middle Class	Total
Badu Nirmana	27.3	28.9	20.0	26.1
Plantation	9.1	14.5	12.5	13.0
Krishi Honda	36.4	19.7	30.0	25.4
Land Levelling	27.3	31.6	35.0	31.9
House Construction	0.0	2.6	0.0	1.4
Toilet	0.0	1.3	0.0	0.7
Borewell recharge	0.0	1.3	2.5	1.4
	100.0	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**

Source: Author's calculations based on Primary Survey Data (Beneficiaries Questionnaire)

Table 17 gives type of works done on individual lands. Land levelling (31.9 percent) was the most frequent work, followed by Badu Nirman (26.1 percent), Krishi Honda (25.4 percent), Plantation (13.0 percent), Borewell recharge (11.4 percent) and Toilet (0.7 percent). Among the Social Groups SC (50.00 percent) preferred Badu Nirman, ST (31.8 percent) Badu Nirman, OBC (43.7 percent) Land levelling and Others (33.3 percent) Krishi Honda. On landless persons' land only House and Toilet could be constructed hence they were least beneficiaries from the individual works. Marginal Farmers (33.8 percent) preferred Badu Nirman, Small Farmers (36.8 percent) preferred land levelling and Semi-Medium Farmers (45.5 percent) preferred Krishi Honda. There were ample evidence of elite capture of individual works under MGNREGA and creamy layers were benefiting more from the assets created on individual land.

Discussions and Conclusions

Workfare programme reduced poverty by providing wage employment in lean season and sustainable assets which has multiplier and productivity enhancement impact. In such programme there was a trade-off between employment generation and the value of assets created, which posed difficult design, implementation and monitoring challenges. GOI guidelines required not less than 60 percent of the budget be spent on wage, which generally affects the quality of the asset. A programme with 60 percent or more expenditure on wage, if not closely monitored, was prone to use of contractors and machine as it saved 90 percent of the cost when compared to the cost, what human labour could manually achieve. If monitoring was weak, field functionaries could use machinery and contractors. It is a widely-known fact that unskilled work can easily be exchanged with machine execution, whenever

beneficiaries rent out their cards or there were bogus cards. In this backdrop there was a need felt to create an agency which could ensure the quality and durability of assets created under the programme through a planned and Calibrated Quality Management Mechanism. The main objective of the Quality Monitors were to ensure quality and durability of the asset. It had three dimensions -- Quality Control, Quality Supervision and Quality Monitoring.

Quality Monitors of assets in Karnataka

In Karnataka, in the year 2013-14 for the first time, a State-Level and several district-level Quality Monitors were empanelled. They were all retired engineers. From the record, it is evident that their salary and compensation are not attractive to ensure good and competent persons are empanelled. They have turned out some works, which have not been evaluated every six months, as was required. Their work turnout has been placed before the State Employment Guarantee Council since 2014, but not much critically reviewed. As there was no Director (QM) at the State-level, it was difficult to obtain full details pertaining to their work. MGNREGA portal or RDPR website also do not provide information on Quality Management initiatives in Karnataka. In the RDPR annual reports there was no information given on this important accountability institution. District authorities also could not readily make available any information on these parameters as they are not part of regular monitoring. Hence, for the study we had to depend on the limited information made available in the three meeting notes of the State Employment Guarantee Council. In those meeting notes also, not much information was available on compliances to their findings and how they have impacted quality improvement. Their work was placed before the Council but not much was discussed. Till 2016, they had found deficiencies worth Rs. 26.242 crore in 382 works, which gives a feeling of large-scale irregularity and deficiency noticed in the quality of assets. Quality Monitors are trained engineers and they employed check measurement as their tool and brought to light both quantitative and qualitative deficiencies in different works. Unlike the findings of Social Audit or Ombudsmen, which required further investigation by a technical person, findings of QMs could be directly acted upon for ordering recovery or actual inquiry or criminal action. It was unfortunate that some of them had brought on table many important findings, but there was no credible response with corrective and curative actions. Lack of adequate responses emboldens defaulters and encourages further irregularity. Case Study 1 clearly showed that the SEGC did not fully appreciate the importance and significance of their work and did not try to actively discuss quality issues and issues related to further improving this institution. They neither encouraged QMs in their effort of identifying irregularities in the quality of works, nor do they press for compliance through recovery of amounts or quality correction by the defaulters etc.

As per the plan in Karnataka State, both State and District Quality Monitors were empanelled, who were mostly retired Engineers. They were trained on Quality Parameters and prepared quality reports. At the state-level a Director (Quality Monitoring) could have been appointed by the Karnataka State but the SEGC decided otherwise. In the absence of a Director (QM), the work of quality monitoring is not coordinated satisfactorily. In Karnataka their findings have not been uploaded on the web portal. Works are also not classified as per the 'Instructions', into Satisfactory (S) Unsatisfactory (US) and Requiring Improvement (RI). Even availability of adequate information is an issue for Quality

Monitoring in Karnataka, as in the absence of Director, there was no one to coordinate and consolidate the same.

MIS developed for the QMs was given scanty importance. The information about their work is not readily available. There was no information as to how much was detected as quality objection by them cumulatively, and how much of it was recovered or corrected or pursued as disciplinary or criminal cases, etc. Hence, the evidences show there was neither credible Quality Monitoring mechanism nor credible enforcement and follow-up mechanism for their reports and findings for the MGNREGA works in the state of Karnataka.

The NREG-soft has negligible information on Quality Monitoring as mandated by the guidelines which gives inkling that neglect of this accountability tool is a pan Indian phenomenon, and it required focussed research and policy responses.

Which States or Regions Benefit from the Multiplier Impact of Assets Created

Comparative details of material component across states show considerable variations. Low Poverty States, except Andhra Pradesh, were showing unusually low ratio (2.29 percent to 33 percent) of material component for all the four years examined. Karnataka showed 31.23 to 35.22 percent variation in material component. Except Andhra Pradesh, which has breached the condition in some years, all other States have adhered to the norms. Tamil Nadu, Kerala, and to some extent, Telangana have adopted a strategy of minimising their material component expenditure. This has few benefits to those states. One, wage component comes fully from the Central Government, and they prefer wage-dominated works, which are mostly de-weeding and jungle clearing, and are easier to execute and are preferred by women. In Kerala and Tamil Nadu we see very high participation of women in MGNREGA. Districts in Karnataka also show little variations and, except Bidar, Chamarajanagara, Yadgir, Chitradurga, Tumkur and Vijayapura for some years, the norms of less than 40 percent on material components was adhered to by all others.

From the secondary evidences it was amply clear that richer and developed states like Telangana, Kerala, Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu, with less number of poor HHs, were creating more assets than the poorer States like Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Jharkhand and Chattisgarh. Same trend is notice for the expenditure on assets created per lakh poor HHs and States with low poverty ratios showed better utilisation and the States with high poverty ratios lagged behind in performance. Karnataka, as a Medium Poverty Ratio State, fell somewhere in between. This amply substantiated that the benefit of multiplier effects of MGNREGA assets, by creating more of them were being reaped predominantly by the richer states who may not need such huge investment as they had much lesser number of poor HHs. Even within the State of Karnataka, various districts show similar trends with relatively more developed districts absorbing more resources. Data conclusively showed that richer and more developed districts, with less number of poor HHs, like Ramanagara, Tumkur, Mandya, Kolar, Shimogga and Hassan had more number of assets created per one lakh poor HHs, whereas it was much lesser for poorer districts with more number of poor and needy HHs like Bidar, Bagalkot, Bellary,

Chitradurga, Haveri and Kalaburagi. Same trend is found for expenditure on assets created per one lakh poor HHs across districts in Karnataka.

Studies indicated a positive return on investment for MGNREGA assets when well executed. The quality and durability of the assets vary vastly across states and districts. Very large numbers of works have been completed and large numbers of them are ongoing. It is a strange fact that in low poverty ratio states, more investment on assets have happened when compared to High Poverty Ratio States, and Medium Poverty Ratio State like Karnataka fell in between.

Who Benefits from the Asset? Neediest, Poorest or the Elites?

There are considerable differences across states on types of work taken up. States like Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and Tamil Nadu have sparingly invested on individual assets, whereas Telangana, Kerala, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra and Karnataka had considerable investment on 'individual assets'. Often individual asset masks the actual execution process because payments are to the beneficiaries of asset up to their own 100 days annual family quota, and they are paid if they were able to show their asset was created. How the asset was created is not watched, monitored or scrutinised.

Through a structured questionnaire view of beneficiaries on the quality of asset and their utility was collected. Most of the beneficiaries had fairly good knowledge of works taken up and they match with the actual work as in the web portal. Majority of the respondents were satisfied with the quality of rural infrastructure works. Authors have visited work sites in 16 sample Gram Panchayats and found quality of individual works are better than rural infrastructure works except construction works, such as Anganwadi buildings, school rooms, Rajiv Gandhi Kendras (GP office), etc. Older infrastructure works, like roads, have deteriorated due to lack of maintenance. But generally, qualities of works were not as good as the beneficiaries' portrayed indicating cooption of beneficiaries in the programme.

Table 14 is very interesting and gives details of who used and benefited from the assets created under this programme. Overwhelming majority (91.8 percent) of beneficiaries said that villagers at large benefitted. Only about 5.6 percent of them thought only SC/ST benefitted, and 2.6 percent thought only upper castes benefitted. Those who got work done on their land, across social groups, there were a clear trend of elite capture as SC (27.3 percent) had the lowest proportion of individual assets created for them, followed by ST (40.00 percent), OBC (49.6 percent) and Others (56.3 percent) having the largest share. Land holding-wise categories showed more pronounced elite capture with landless (9.2 percent) having the least, followed by marginal (63.2 percent), small (64.8 percent) and Semi Medium (61.3 percent) farmers respectively. Asset holding categories also showed strong bias towards the richer and creamy layer with Lower Middle Class (23.2 percent) having the least share, followed by Middle Class (43.7 percent) and Upper Middle Class (68.4 percent) was having the largest. These substantiated the findings of Rao, Kumar and Madhusudan (2015) and it was definitely due to the liberalised guideline (of 2013) on individual benefits to be given to the small and marginal farmers. There was no earmarking for SC/STs, landless households and the weakest.

Public Works, consisting of soil and water conservation and individual works, predominantly benefit the land holding communities proportionate to their holdings, and poor HH without land could

only benefit if house or toilets are sanctioned to them on their home stead. In our sample, the weakest have not got even the benefit of housing and toilets. In practice, two third of the assets are captured by the elites and only rural infrastructure like rural road works help rich and poor alike. Evidences also show that satisfaction levels for the assets was highest for the elites and least for the SC/STs and the weak.

Individual works executed show great variations. On the sites of landless persons only houses or individual toilets could be constructed, hence they were the least frequent beneficiaries for the individual work. These landless beneficiaries were also from the better-off asset class. From the group discussions and records it emerges conclusively that there was primacy given to the land and water resource development programmes and those with land holdings benefitted proportionate to their land holdings from the individual as well as the rural infrastructure assets, and landless HHs, who were poorest and the neediest, were left out. Elites with better awareness and network accessed the programme more frequently and liberalisation of criteria for the selection of beneficiaries of MGNREGA for individual assets in 2013 enabled members of the creamy layer to corner most of the assets created and their multiplier impact was not at all accruing to the poor HHs. Hence, there were conclusive evidence of elite capture of individual works executed under MGNREGA and creamy layers were benefiting more from those works.

In the light of the foregoing discussions it is also evident that there was no credible Quality Monitoring Mechanism for MGNREGA assets in the State of Karnataka. There was hardly any enforcement and follow-up mechanism for the reports and findings of the Quality Monitors. Overall, it appears that the State is only interested in maximising utilisation of MGNREGA funds as it largely comes from the Government of India and has little inclination or incentive for quality improvement. Lack of quality consciousness appears to be largely due to states having no financial stake in the programme, most of the resources are coming from the Central Government and, hence, state may not see any value in quality monitoring and quality improvement. There is a need for further focussed pan Indian study on this aspect of MGNREGA.

From the evidences regarding the primary and the secondary data, it is conclusively established that the benefits of the sustainable assets created and their multiplier impacts are not accruing to the poorer states, poorer regions and the poor HHs. MGNREGA remains a passive programme dependent on self-selection and demand drive, which, due to inherent institutional strengths in those states and regions with less poverty, remains more effective in traditionally stronger and richer states and regions. Poorer states and regions remain bound in a negative vicious cycle of low institutional capacity, low utilisation, low six percent administrative cost and low improvement in their institutional capacities. Forerunners of this programme like NREP, JRY, RLEGP etc., had formula-based devolution and, hence, poorer states, with limited administrative capacity, could plan developing their capacities to deliver the programme, but in MGNREGA one has to spend first substantially, then, based on their earlier expenditure, only six percent of that amount could be spent on administrative strengthening, which is a self-limiting policy for the poorer states with inherent poor capacity to implement. In poorer states, there was last mile disconnect as their Gram Panchayats lacked capacity to handle such large programmes. They were not having enough Junior Engineers and other technical staff

who could fulfil the complex administrative requirements of MGNREGA. Therefore, under the programme guidelines, there was nothing which corrected this anomaly and enabled last mile capacity building for them. It certainly was a mute question, why policy has not addressed this observed contradiction on record which gives a feeling that the 'Malai' (cream) - the more precious benefit of asset (compared to the wage employment) with multiplier impact are left for the richer states and richer regions to reap with their inherent capacity advantages.

Policy Implications, Suggestions and Ways Forward

Along with Social Audit and Ombudsman; Quality Monitors are the third important accountability institution under the MGNREGA. As asset were more valued; productivity enhancing and poverty eliminating intervention; rightly quality and sustainability of the asset was very important for MGNREGA and hence, Quality Monitoring Goals were very pertinent. But it appears from the responses that in the state of Karnataka this institution remained weak due to lack of focus and credible mechanism to enforce the findings of the Quality Monitors.

It was essential to improve capacities of Quality Monitors by better training and encouraging remuneration. It was important to introduce proper formats and scope, for fortnightly monitoring of their work and its compliances, as they have brought to light many irregularities. The SEGC should give more importance to the findings of Quality Monitors and try to enforce them. At the state-level, absence of a capable Director (QM) has created a vacuum causing non-availability of basic information on Quality Monitoring activities over the years. A Director was required to introduce seriousness in the Quality Monitoring work, and to assist both the SEGC and the government in successfully implementing the mandate of Quality Monitoring.

As per guidelines, all details on quality monitoring should have been hosted on the NREG-soft, but it is not available for any state, hence, it appears to be a completely neglected activity throughout India and its importance is not fully appreciated. Findings of Social Audit and Ombudsman required further investigation by an appropriate authority to convert them into recovery, and disciplinary (or criminal) action; but Quality Monitor's findings were technically sound to take immediate action. Quality Monitors are trained engineers and they did check measurements and actual technical quality checks, hence, their reports gave clear cases of defects in measurement, use of low-quality material and variance in specifications of any aspect of the physical assets.

It appears that the priority of the states, including Karnataka, under MGNREGA remains maximising budget utilisation, as most of the funds are coming from the Central Government and financial stakes of the states are very small; hence, they had limited incentive for quality consciousness, monitoring and improvement. Some of the states, like Kerala and Tamil Nadu, show very low (less than 10 percent) expenditure on material component, which required focussed research to understand how they maintained sustainability and quality of their assets. It was evident that some states were choosing types of work and percentage of material component selectively, and succeeding in maximising their fund sourcing from the Central Government, and utilisation. This needs to be further studied to identify its causes and benefits and the findings may be used for fine tuning policy for the benefit of the poor regions and the states.

The evidence available before us showed strong inherent capacity weakness in the poorer states and poorer regions, whose last mile administrative connectivity and capacity of GPs were limited, particularly their trained technical staffs like engineers and agricultural assistants and other support staffs need augmentation. As pro-rata six percent of the total budget spent the previous year was made available for strengthening these shortcomings, poorer states and regions with historical weakness remained in vicious cycle of low capacity – low utilisation – low fund availability for capacity augmentation. This cycle should be broken with policy reversal and going back to predetermined, need-based (based on poverty ratios and poor HHs numbers) allocation so that the weaker states could augment their capacity and catch up with the better performing states. As multiplier impact of asset was not accruing to the poorer regions and states, more focussed research was required to understand its causes and to evolve suitable policy responses.

There was emergent need to stop elite capture of assets through targeting economically and socially weaker sections i.e., landless labourers and SC/STs etc. Reservation for women within the universal programme is provided in the Act, for assets also, there was a strong case for targeting (reservation for SC/STs and landless) so that its benefits accrued to the neediest and its impact on poverty was more profound. Targeting within universalism is an excellent policy providing best of both approaches.

In the light of foregoing discussion and conclusions, states may be disinclined to strengthen Quality Monitoring mechanism unless they have substantial financial stake in the programme and, hence, proper resource sharing mechanism should be evolved and the states with better financial resources may be encouraged through incentives and disincentives to share financing the programme. Poorer states and poorer regions within states need financial support and hand-holding to improve their capacities to better participate in the programme and enhance their fund utilisation. Guidelines of passive support to the weaker states and regions with six percent of the previous year's expenditure as administrative cost was not a good policy as it binds weaker states and regions in a vicious cycle of low capacities, low utilisation, and low allocation for administrative strengthening, doing injustice to them.

Quality Monitoring was an important accountability tool and a great programme innovation, but it was a neglected intervention all over India and required more focussed research and discussion besides support from the Government and other stakeholders.

References

Babu, V S, K H Rao and K Jayashree (2015). Impact of MGNREGS on Economics of Small Holder Agriculture. *Asia-Pacific Journal of Rural Development*, 25 (1).

Bhaskar, A and P Yadav (2015). *All's Well That Ends In A Well: An Economic Evaluation of MGNREGA Wells in Jharkhand*. Institute for Human Development.

Chikkathimme Gouda, H R (2015). *Economic Impact of MGNREGP on Rural Livelihood Security in Tumkur District, Karnataka – A SAM Analysis*. Bengaluru: Department of Agricultural Economics, University of Agricultural Sciences, GKVK.

Dreze, Jeans, Reethika Khera and Siddhartha (2008). Corruption in NREGA: Myths and Reality. *The Hindu*, January 22, 2008.

Kajale, J and S Shroff (2018). From EGS to MGNREGS in Maharashtra: Were the Programme Potentials Achieved?. In *Employment Guarantee Programme and Dynamics of Rural Transformation in India.* Springer, Singapore. Pp 155-73.

Kareemulla, K, S Kumar, K S Reddy, C R Rao and B Venkateshwarlu (2010). Impact of NREGS on Rural Livelihoods and Agricultural Capital Formation. *Indian Journal of Agricultural Economics*, 65 (3): 524-39.

Koyu B, A Sarkar, R Singh and R J Singh (2017). Is MGNREGA myth for Arunachal Pradesh? Field Evidence. *Economic Affairs*, 62 (2): 313.

MORD (2012). MGNREGA Sameeksha. In Shah Mihir (ed), *An Anthology of Research Studies on the MGNREG Act, 2005, 2006-2012*. Orient Blackswan Private Limited.

———— (2013). *MGNREGA Operational Guidelines 2013*. Government of India.

Narayanamoorthy, A, M Bhattarai and R Suresh (2018). Has Profitability of Foodgrain Production Declined After Implementation of MGNREGS in India? In *Employment Guarantee Programme and Dynamics of Rural Transformation in India*. Springer, Singapore. Pp 131-52.

Raghunathan, K and S Hari (2014). Providing more than Just Employment? Evidence from the NREGA in India. Unpublished Working Paper.

Rao, Srinivas, Alamuru Kumar and B V Madhusudhan (2013). *Role of MGNREGA in Improving Land Productivity*. Centre for Budget and Policy Studies, Bangalore for the Department of Rural Development, Government of Karnataka.

Ravallion, M (1998). *Appraising Workfare Programs*. Washington, DC: World Bank, No. Pov-102, September 1998,

Ravi, Shamika and Monika Engler (2015). *Workfare as an Effective Way to Fight Poverty: A Case of India's NREGS*. World Development.

Shah, T, S Verma, R Indu and P Hemant (2010*). Asset Creation through Employment Guarantee?: Synthesis of Student Case Studies in 9 states of India*. International Water Management Institute (IWMI).

Srikanth, Murthy P S, M Bhattarai and Gourav Kumar (2014-15). What is the Scale of Multiplier Impacts of MGNREGS in India? Village Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) in Two Villages of Karnataka. In Marothia, D, W Martin, A Janaiah and C L Dadhich (eds), *Re-visiting Agricultural Policies In the Light of Globalisation Experience: The Indian Context*. Indian Society of Agricultural Economies.

Vani, G K, P S Murthy and M Bhattarai (2018). Inter-Sectoral Linkages and Multipliers of MGNREGA in a Rainfed Village in Karnataka: Application of Social Accounting Matrix (SAM). In *Employment Guarantee Programme and Dynamics of Rural Transformation in India*. Singapore: Springer. Pp 245-63.

Recent Working Papers

433 Fiscal Dependency of States in India
Darshini J S and K Gayithri

434 Determinants of Farm-Level Adoption of System of Rice and Wheat ntensification in Gaya, Bihar
Shikha Pandey and Parmod Kumar

435 Monsoon Diseases in Lower Kuttanad (Kerala): An Environmental Perspective
Bejo Jacob Raju and S Manasi

436 Risk Sources and Management Strategies of Farmers: Evidence from Mahanadi River Basin of Odisha in India
Jayanti Mala Nayak and A V Manjunatha

437 Determinants of Intra Urban Mobility: A Study of Bengaluru
Shivakumar Nayka and Kala Seetharam Sridhar

438 Structure and Strategy of Supermarkets of Fruits and Vegetables Retailing in Karnataka: Gains for Whom?
Kedar Vishnu and Parmod Kumar

439 Income and Vehicular Growth in India: A Time Series Econometric Analysis
Vijayalakshmi S and Krishna Raj

440 A Critical Review of Apprenticeship Policy of India
K Gayithri, Malini L Tantri and D Rajasekhar

441 Sustainability Concerns on Sugarcane Production in Maharashtra, India: A Decomposition and Instability Analysis
Abnave Vikas B

442 Economic, Occupational and Livelihood Changes of Scheduled Tribes of North East India
Reimeingam Marchang

443 Need for a Study of State Policies towards the Development of Religious Minorities in Karnataka
Azhar Khan C A

444 An Analysis of Bilateral Trade Between Canada and India
Malini L Tantri and Preet S Aulakh

445 Should they Avoid the Middlemen? An Analysis of Fish Processing Firms in India
Meenakshmi Rajeev and Pranav Nagendran

446 Growth and Consolidation of Kerala Non-Gazetted Officers' Union: From Its Formative Years to Union Militancy Phase
Jithin G

447 The Relationship Between Economic Growth and Carbon Emissions in India
Kaumudi Misra

448 Tax Revenue in India: Trends and Issues
Pratap Singh

449 Technical Efficienc of Unorganised Food Processing Industry in India: A Stochastic Frontier Analysis
Padmavathi N

450 Demonetisation 2016 and Its Impact on Indian Economy and Taxation
Pratap Singh

451 Impact of Perform-Achieve-Trade Policy on the Energy Intensity of Cement and Iron and Steel Industries in India
Kaumudi Misra

452 Impact of Non-Cognitive Skills on Cognitive Learning Outcomes: A Study of Elementary Education in India
Indrajit Bairagya and Rohit Mukerji

453 Assessment of Vulnerability to Floods in Coastal Odisha: A District-Level Analysis
Niranjan Pradhan and S Madheswaran

454 Who Benefits from Higher Education Expenditure? Evidence from Recent Household Survery of India
Ramanjini and Karnam Gayithri

455 How the Modern Food Retail Chains Emerging as Alternative Channels of Agricultural Marketing? Evidence from Karnataka
Kedar Vishnu, Parmod Kumar and A V Manjunatha

456 Educational Development, and Household and Public Expenditures on Education in Manipur
Reimeingam Marchang

457 Social Audit of MGNREGA - A Panacea or a Placebo? Issues and Ways Forward in Karnataka
Sanjiv Kumar and S Madheswaran

458 State, Religion and Society: Changing Roles of Faith-Based Organisations in Kerala
Abdul Raoof

459 Single Child Families in Tripura: Evidence from National Family Health Surveys
N Pautunthang and T S Syamala

460 MGNREGA Ombudsman a Forlorn Scarecrow: Issues and Ways Forward in Karnataka
Sanjiv Kumar and S Madheswaran

461 Dynamics of Procurement of Modern Food Retail Chains: Evidences from Karnataka
Kedar Vishnu and Parmod Kumar

462 Determinants of Micro-Level Decisions of Sugarcane Farmers
Lavanya B T and A V Manjunatha

463 Assessing Quality of Higher Education: An Empirical Study of Commerce Graduates, Kerala State
Indrajit Bairagya and Bino Joy

464 Farmers' Perception on Risk and Management Strategies in Mahanadi River Basin in Odisha: An Economic Analysis
Jayanti Mala Nayak and A V Manjunatha

465 An Analysis of Revenue Diversification Across Select Indian States
J S Darshini and K Gayithri

466 Urban Governance in the Context of Urban 'Primacy': A Comparison of Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh
Anil Kumar Vaddiraju

Price: ₹ 30.00 ISBN 978-81-946531-8-9

INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGE
(ISEC is an ICSSR Research Institute, Government of India
and the Grant-in-Aid Institute, Government of Karnataka)
Dr V K R V Rao Road, Nagarabhavi P.O., Bangalore - 560 072, India
Phone: 0091-80-23215468, 23215519, 23215592; Fax: 0091-80-23217008
E-mail: balasubramanian@isec.ac.in; Web: www.isec.ac.in